Attached are the assigned text as well as the powerpoint, it is a compare and contrast essay 3-4 pages long. attached is also the prompt and instructions thank you ! please complete by friday !first_essay_spring2016.pdflocke_second_treatise_civil_government_document.pdfrousseau_social_contract_document.pdfscientific_revolution_enlightenment_spring2016_2.pptxFirst Essay
due Saturday, February 6 at noon to Turnitin.com
Directions (100 points):
Respond to the question below. To answer the question, you will need to review power
points on Absolutism and the Enlightenment; your lecture notes on Absolutism and the
Enlightenment; read the corresponding pages of Chapter 15 relating to political
transformation and the assigned documents provided below located on Milestone
Documents.
Assigned Milestone Documents:
John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract (1762)
Written response engages the following student learning outcomes:
1. Improving critical reading and analysis of historical sources.
2. Effective essay writing using both primary and secondary historical sources
3. Engaging the formation of world culture through cross-cultural interaction and
exchange
Here is the question:
Q: Both John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau examine the function of
government in their respective treatises. Compare and contrast their arguments,
analyzing specific excerpts from their arguments as means to support your
position. In your conclusion, reflect upon how their arguments on the function of
government illustrate an emergence of a new worldview within Europe.
This is an analysis question. It is requiring you to examine and break information into
parts by identifying motives and causes. Make inferences to support generalizations.
Directions for Structure of Essay:
Your essay should be three to four pages in length.
Your response should have an introduction that introduces your focus, providing
historical context to your focus, ending your introduction with a well-defined thesis
statement.
Your introduction should also define any historic terms that you will use throughout
your essay, so that you are establishing a clear foundation for your reader to follow your
argument.
You should develop your thesis statement in the body of your response with clear topic
sentences for each paragraph and selected evidential support from the assigned
documents that you interpret in support of your thesis statement. Be sure to connect
your review of the documents to the historical context of the Early Modern Period.
Your response should have a conclusion that addresses the emergence of new
worldview and summarizes your major points and redirects the reader’s attention back
to your thesis statement, underscoring how you have proven your position on the
question.
Format your paper in the MLA style. You should have a title page for your essay. In the
MLA style, if you have title page, then you suppress the header on the title page and
start the header and pagination on the first page of your essay.
For citing sources, use the MLA style format. Provide citations to documents used or
any source or reference to a source in your response (this includes general information
referenced from the textbook, specific citations or quotes from documents in the
textbook and any outside material used in your response). You should provide a citation
after the sentence where you have referenced a source. You should follow the MLA
format for in-text citations. See the guidelines for citations in the Introduction section
of the course website.
Be sure to include a ‘Works Cited” that provides a list of all sources referenced and
used in your essay. The “Works Cited” appears at the end of your essay, on an
independent page. If you write a three-page essay, then the “Works Cited” is the fourth
page. If you write a five-page essay, then the “Works Cited” is the sixth page.
Review your work for spelling errors or grammatical errors before submitting your
response.
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this constitutes plagiarism and you will receive a zero.
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turnitin.com, you should download the uploaded paper with its ID receipt and placed
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missed written response.
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A link for the first essay at
John Locke: Second Treatise on Civil Government – Document Text
http://www.milestonedocuments.com/documents/view/john-lockes-…
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John Locke: Second Treatise on Civil Government
(1690)
D ocum en t Tex t
Chapter II. Of the State of Nature.
Sect. 4. To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a
state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.—A state also of equality wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that the creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and
confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the
foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives
the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things
which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man’s hands, as any man can
wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire,
which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in
all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew greater
measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible
may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves
and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant. Eccl. Pol. lib.
i.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of
his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use
than its bare preservation calls for it. T he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that
law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty,
or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent
into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one
another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such
subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of
creatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own
preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on
an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be
observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s
hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature
would, as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that
law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has
done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what
any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal,
when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him,
so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and
restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing
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the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has
set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and
violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by
the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary,
destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of
it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, every man hath a
right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.
Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what
right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any
sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to
hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those
who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without
authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to
require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no
more power than what every man naturally may have over another.
Sect. 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some
person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the
right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who
finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the
harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing
is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being
magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law,
remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he
has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has
this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish
the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order
to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury,
which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the
attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence
and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those
wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth
man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after
the murder of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death?
I answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender,
give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may in the state of
nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter
here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible
and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is
easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly
are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to
be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will
be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their
friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion
and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily
grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may
be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to
condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government
is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from men’s being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not
to be endured, I desire to know how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be
judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those
who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the
state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other
case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an
answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the
world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether
they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of
agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with
another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c between the two men in the desert island, mentioned
by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they
are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of
society.
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Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl.
Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says, The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they
are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but
forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth
desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was the cause of men’s uniting themselves at first in
politic societies. But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves
members of some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.
Chapter III. Of the State of War.
Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a
sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has
exposed his life to the other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being
reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man
being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a
man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such
men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of
prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.
Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with
him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his
power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body
can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me
a slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation,
who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of
war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed
to have a design to take away everything else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society, would take
away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else,
and so be looked on as in a state of war.
Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther
than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he
has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty,
would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself
into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is
aggressor in it.
Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded,
are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual
destruction, are one from another. M en living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge
between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common
superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an
aggressor, tho’ he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am
worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it
cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of
war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for
remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force
without right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.
Sect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to
the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where
no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun,
continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation
on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and
constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or
indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence
is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name,
pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are under it;
wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only
remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there
is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men’s putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature:
for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded,
and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between
Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says
he) be judge this day between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying on his appeal,
he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? It cannot be meant, who
shall decide the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no judge on
earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war
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with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer
it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.
Chapter IV. Of Slavery.
Sect. 22. The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man,
but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by
consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to
the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live
as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every
one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not;
and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other
restraint but the law of nature.
Sect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part
with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own
consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No
body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having
by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay
to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh
the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
Sect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a
captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the
state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that
which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life. I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell
themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary,
despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his
service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as
maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.
Chapter V. Of Property.
Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to
meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God
made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the
children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever
come to have a property in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that
God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any
property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall
endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without
any express compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and
convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has
originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the
use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to
any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be
his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of
the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes
it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that
excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly
appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or
when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them
not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the
common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus
appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to
all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons,
which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins
the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the
commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them
in common with others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of
that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
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Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one’s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in
common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to
every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who
drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath
thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour
upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have
made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before
common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or
what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes
that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast
that is still looked upon as common, and no man’s private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find
and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Source: The Works of John Locke , vol. 5. London: 1801.
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract
(1762)
D ocum en t Tex t
Book I
I mean to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as they are and laws as they
might be. In this inquiry I shall endeavour always to unite what right sanctions with what is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and
utility may in no case be divided.
I enter upon my task without proving the importance of the subject. I shall be asked if I am a prince or a legislator, to write on politics. I
answer that I am neither, and that is why I do so. If I were a prince or a legislator, I should not waste time in saying what wants doing; I should
do it, or hold my peace.
As I was born a citizen of a free State, and a member of the Sovereign, I feel that, however feeble the influence my voice can have on public
affairs, the right of voting on them makes it my duty to study them: and I am happy, when I reflect upon governments, to find my inquiries
always furnish me with new reasons for loving that of my own country.
1. Subject of the First Book
Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did
this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.
If I took into account only force, and the effects derived from it, I should say: “As long as a people is compelled to obey, and obeys, it does
well; as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does still better; for, regaining its liberty by the same right as took it away, either
it is justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it away.” But the social order is a sacred right which is the basis
of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions. Before coming to that, I
have to prove what I have just asserted. . . .
3. The Right of the Strongest
The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty. Hence the
right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have
an explanation of this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity,
not of will—at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty?
Suppose for a moment that this so-called “right” exists. I maintain that the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates
right, the effect changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with
impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the
strongest. But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought;
and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the word “right” adds nothing to force: in this connection, it
means absolutely nothing.
Obey the powers that be. If this means yield to force, it is a good precept, but superfluous: I can answer for its never being violated. All power
comes from God, I admit; but so does all sickness: does that mean that we are forbidden to call in the doctor? A brigand surprises me at the
edge of a wood: must I not merely surrender my purse on compulsion; but, even if I could withhold it, am I in conscience bound to give it up?
For certainly the pistol he holds is also a power.
Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers. In that case, my original question
recurs. . . .
6. The Social Compact
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I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of
resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then
subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence.
But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the
formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single
motive power, and cause to act in concert.
This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of
his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty,
in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms:
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each
associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” This is the
fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution.
The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so
that, although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised,
until, on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional
liberty in favour of which he renounced it.
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole
community; for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any
interest in making them burdensome to others.
Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the
individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his
own judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily become inoperative or
tyrannical.
Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right
as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has.
If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
“Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we
receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed
of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public
person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called
by its members State when passive. Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it
take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws
of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being
used with precision.
7. The Sovereign
This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each
individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the
individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to
himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of
which you form a part.
Attention must further be called to the fact that public deliberation, while competent to bind all the subjects to the Sovereign, because of the
two different capacities in which each of them may be regarded, cannot, for the opposite reason, bind the Sovereign to itself; and that it is
consequently against the nature of the body politic for the Sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot infringe. Being able to regard
itself in only one capacity, it is in the position of an individual who makes a contract with himself; and this makes it clear that there neither is
nor can be any kind of fundamental law binding on the body of the people—not even the social contract itself. This does not mean that the
body politic cannot enter into undertakings with others, provided the contract is not infringed by them; for in relation to what is external to it,
it becomes a simple being, an individual.
But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to
do anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by
which it exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing.
As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body, and still
more to offend against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to
give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity.
Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and
consequently the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members.
We shall also see later on that it cannot hurt any in particular. The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is always what it should be.
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This, however, is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign, which, despite the common interest, would have no security
that they would fulfil their undertakings, unless it found means to assure itself of their fidelity.
In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular
interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look
upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is
burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person which constitutes the State as a persona ficta, because not a man, he may wish to
enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject. The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the
undoing of the body politic.
In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest,
that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be
forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies
the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimises civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and
liable to the most frightful abuses.
8. The Civil State
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his
conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses
and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his
reason before listening to his inclinations. Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got from nature, he gains
in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so
uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the
happy moment which took him from it for ever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and a man.
Let us draw up the whole account in terms easily commensurable. What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited
right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. If we are to
avoid mistake in weighing one against the other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the
individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and possession, which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first
occupier, from property, which can be founded only on a positive title.
We might, over and above all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself;
for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. But I have already said too
much on this head, and the philosophical meaning of the word liberty does not now concern us.
Book II
…
9. The Marks of a Good Government
The question “What absolutely is the best government?” is unanswerable as well as indeterminate; or rather, there are as many good answers
as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative situations of all nations.
But if it is asked by what sign we may know that a given people is well or ill governed, that is another matter, and the question, being one of
fact, admits of an answer.
It is not, however, answered, because everyone wants to answer it in his own way. Subjects extol public tranquillity, citizens individual liberty;
the one class prefers security of possessions, the other that of person; the one regards as the best government that which is most severe, the
other maintains that the mildest is the best; the one wants crimes punished, the other wants them prevented; the one wants the State to be
feared by its neighbours, the other prefers that it should be ignored; the one is content if money circulates, the other demands that the people
shall have bread. Even if an agreement were come to on these and similar points, should we have got any further? As moral qualities do not
admit of exact measurement, agreement about the mark does not mean agreement about the valuation.
For my part, I am continually astonished that a mark so simple is not recognised, or that men are of so bad faith as not to admit it. What is the
end of political association? The preservation and prosperity of its members. And what is the surest mark of their preservation and prosperity?
Their numbers and population. Seek then nowhere else this mark that is in dispute. The rest being equal, the government under which, without
external aids, without naturalisation or colonies, the citizens increase and multiply most, is beyond question the best. The government under
which a people wanes and diminishes is the worst. Calculators, it is left for you to count, to measure, to compare.
10. The Abuse of Government and Its Tendency to Degenerate
As the particular will acts constantly in opposition to the general will, the government continually exerts itself against the Sovereignty. The
greater this exertion becomes, the more the constitution changes; and, as there is in this case no other corporate will to create an equilibrium
by resisting the will of the prince, sooner or later the prince must inevitably suppress the Sovereign and break the social treaty. This is the
unavoidable and inherent defect which, from the very birth of the body politic, tends ceaselessly to destroy it, as age and death end by
destroying the human body.
There are two general courses by which government degenerates: i.e., when it undergoes contraction, or when the State is dissolved.
Government undergoes contraction when it passes from the many to the few, that is, from democracy to aristocracy, and from aristocracy to
royalty. To do so is its natural propensity. If it took the backward course from the few to the many, it could be said that it was relaxed; but this
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inverse sequence is impossible.
Indeed, governments never change their form except when their energy is exhausted and leaves them too weak to keep what they have. If a
government at once extended its sphere and relaxed its stringency, its force would become absolutely nil, and it would persist still less. It is
therefore necessary to wind up the spring and tighten the hold as it gives way: or else the State it sustains will come to grief.
The dissolution of the State may come about in either of two ways.
First, when the prince ceases to administer the State in accordance with the laws, and usurps the Sovereign power. A remarkable change then
occurs: not the government, but the State, undergoes contraction; I mean that the great State is dissolved, and another is formed within it,
composed solely of the members of the government, which becomes for the rest of the people merely master and tyrant. So that the moment
the government usurps the Sovereignty, the social compact is broken, and all private citizens recover by right their natural liberty, and are
forced, but not bound, to obey.
The same thing happens when the members of the government severally usurp the power they should exercise only as a body; this is as great
an infraction of the laws, and results in even greater disorders. There are then, so to speak, as many princes as there are magistrates, and the
State, no less divided than the government, either perishes or changes its form.
When the State is dissolved, the abuse of government, whatever it is, bears the common name of anarchy. To distinguish, democracy
degenerates into ochlocracy, and aristocracy into oligarchy; and I would add that royalty degenerates into tyranny; but this last word is
ambiguous and needs explanation.
In vulgar usage, a tyrant is a king who governs violently and without regard for justice and law. In the exact sense, a tyrant is an individual
who arrogates to himself the royal authority without having a right to it. This is how the Greeks understood the word “tyrant”: they applied it
indifferently to good and bad princes whose authority was not legitimate. Tyrant and usurper are thus perfectly synonymous terms.
In order that I may give different things different names, I call him who usurps the royal authority a tyrant, and him who usurps the sovereign
power a despot. The tyrant is he who thrusts himself in contrary to the laws to govern in accordance with the laws; the despot is he who sets
himself above the laws themselves. Thus the tyrant cannot be a despot, but the despot is always a tyrant. . . .
Book III
16. That the Institution of Government Is Not a Contract
The legislative power once well established, the next thing is to establish similarly the executive power; for this latter, which operates only by
particular acts, not being of the essence of the former, is naturally separate from it. Were it possible for the Sovereign, as such, to possess the
executive power, right and fact would be so confounded that no one could tell what was law and what was not; and the body politic, thus
disfigured, would soon fall a prey to the violence it was instituted to prevent.
As the citizens, by the social contract, are all equal, all can prescribe what all should do, but no one has a right to demand that another shall do
what he does not do himself. It is strictly this right, which is indispensable for giving the body politic life and movement, that the Sovereign,
in instituting the government, confers upon the prince.
It has been held that this act of establishment was a contract between the people and the rulers it sets over itself,—a contract in which
conditions were laid down between the two parties binding the one to command and the other to obey. It will be admitted, I am sure, that this
is an odd kind of contract to enter into. But let us see if this view can be upheld.
First, the supreme authority can no more be modified than it can be alienated; to limit it is to destroy it. It is absurd and contradictory for the
Sovereign to set a superior over itself; to bind itself to obey a master would be to return to absolute liberty.
Moreover, it is clear that this contract between the people and such and such persons would be a particular act; and from this is follows that it
can be neither a law nor an act of Sovereignty, and that consequently it would be illegitimate.
It is plain too that the contracting parties in relation to each other would be under the law of nature alone and wholly without guarantees of
their mutual undertakings, a position wholly at variance with the civil state. He who has force at his command being always in a position to
control execution, it would come to the same thing if the name “contract” were given to the act of one man who said to another: “I give you
all my goods, on condition that you give me back as much of them as you please.”
There is only one contract in the State, and that is the act of association, which in itself excludes the existence of a second. It is impossible to
conceive of any public contract that would not be a violation of the first.
Source: Jean Jacques Rousseau. Social Contract & Discourses. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1913.
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Examine how the Scientific Revolution and the
Enlightenment promoted new ways of thinking
about the world
Exchange of information and technology via
global trade instigated the Scientific Revolution
(1540-1690) in Europe.
Scientific Revolution established a new outlook
on the world, that sought to apply mathematics
and experimentation to the physical world.
This scientific approach fosters a
movement known as the Enlightenment.
cultural
An intellectual and cultural movement in
Europe that occurred between 1690-1789.
Introduced new ways of thinking based on
the use of reason and scientific method.
Philosophes: a group of intellectuals who
proclaimed that they were bringing the light
of knowledge to their fellow human being.
The application of scientific methodology to
understand all aspects of human life.
The application of the scientific methodology
would illuminate the laws of human society as
well as the laws of nature.
The pursuit of knowledge was the key for the
betterment of society, knowledge was
progress.
Q: How did the ideas of the Enlightenment spread?
Publications presented ideas to a reading public.
The growth of cities facilitated an exchange of ideas.
◦ Salons
◦ Lending libraries
◦ Coffee houses
These public forums fostered a robust engagement of
the ideas of the Enlightenment.
English Philosophe
writes Second Treatise
of Civil Government
(1690)
Argues political
authority is bestowed
upon the ruler by his
subjects.
John Locke (1632-1704)
Constitutionalism: a form of government in
which power of the ruler is limited by law and
balanced between the authority and power of
the government, on one hand, and the rights
and liberties of the subject or citizen, on the
other.
King granted certain privileges to his lords
such as right to fair trial, a jury of one’s
peers, ability to dissent with king’s wishes
without fear of punishment.
Swiss Philosophe
Writes Social Contract
(1762)
Defines the concepts
of general will and
popular sovereignty
Jean Jacques Rousseau
(1712 -1778)
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